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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, more than three dozen jurisdictions in the 
United States passed some form of social enterprise legislation.1 Social 
enterprise statutes allow for the formation of for-profit entities that 
expressly require directors to consider the interests of corporate 
constituents beyond merely shareholders.2 Proponents of these social 
enterprise statutes argue that such statutes are needed because traditional 
corporate law prevents sacrificing the financial interests of shareholders in 
the interest of a broader social good, or in the interest of other stakeholders. 
Recently, social enterprises have started exploring public markets and 
showing up on the radar of investment professionals, including those 
covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 
ERISA has long required plan fiduciaries to “discharge [their] duties with 
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries,” 
but various iterations of guidance from the Department of Labor (DOL) 
show differing amounts of favor or disfavor toward Economically 
Targeted Investments (ETIs)—investments made for financial returns and 
collateral social benefits to participants.3 This Article seeks to uncover and 
explain the relationship between social enterprises (most of which are 
likely to be classified as ETIs) and ERISA, while also discussing the 
current and future place of social investing in the broader financial world. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of impact investing 
and the array of newly created social enterprise legal forms. Part II takes 
stock of the current state of social enterprise investing. Part III examines 
ERISA and the DOL’s guidance on extra-financial considerations when 
making investment decisions. Part IV describes the difficult line 
proponents of social enterprise forms, such as benefit corporations, must 
walk. On one hand, social enterprise proponents argue for the statutory 
permission to intentionally sacrifice profits, and, on the other hand, they 
argue that social enterprises will provide a market rate of return. The last 
                                                     
 1. See Here’s the Latest L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C, 
http://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c_tally.html [https://perma.cc/M52P-2XPQ] [hereinafter L3C Tally] 
(showing nine states and two Native American tribes have passed L3C legislation since 2008); State 
by State Status of Legislation, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-
status [https://perma.cc/5BMF-REQ4] (noting that thirty states and the District of Columbia have 
passed benefit corporation legislation since 2016). 
 2. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 
706–07 (2013) (noting the mandate by social enterprise law, such as benefit corporation law, for 
directors to consider various stakeholders). 
 3. See infra Part III. 
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substantive section, Part V, unpacks financing options outside of the 
ERISA umbrella for social enterprises such as venture capital and 
crowdfunding while also considering the future of social enterprise 
investing under ERISA. A brief conclusion closes the Article. 
I. IMPACT INVESTING AND SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LEGAL FORMS 
Interest in social enterprises, organizations that use commercial 
means to reach social ends, is increasing among entrepreneurs, investors, 
governments, attorneys, and customers.4 This Part starts with a brief 
overview of the various social enterprise legal forms available in the 
United States and discusses some of the debates among experts related to 
these social enterprise forms. 
A. Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies  
In 2008, Vermont passed the first social enterprise law in the United 
States, allowing for the formation of low-profit limited liability companies 
(L3Cs).5 Including Vermont, a total of nine states have passed L3C laws 
(though, North Carolina repealed its L3C law effective January 1, 2014, 
bringing the total number of active L3C state statutes down to eight).6 The 
passage of L3C legislation has stalled in more recent years with Rhode 
                                                     
 4. See, e.g., DAVID BORNSTEIN & SUSAN DAVIS, SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHAT 
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 1–20 (2010) (describing the history and definitions of social 
entrepreneurship); MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN 
ENTREPRENEURS 1–15 (2011) (noting the increase in social enterprises and providing a definition of 
social enterprise as a business that is mission-driven and seeks to better the lives of others); Tania 
Bucic, Jennifer Harris & Denni Arli, Ethical Consumers Among the Millennials: A Cross-National 
Study, 110 J. BUS. ETHICS 113, 113–14 (2012) (noting ethical purchasing habits and varying levels of 
engagement with cause-related marketing); Andrew White, Lessons from Companies That Put 
Purpose Ahead of Short-Term Profits, HARV. BUS. REV., June 9, 2016, https://hbr.org/ 
2016/06/lessons-from-companies-that-put-purpose-ahead-of-short-term-profits?mod=djemCFO_h 
(describing companies that are seeking social purpose); J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law 
Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 543–55 (2016) (describing the various social enterprise statutes enacted 
by state governments in the United States over the past decade); Sean Greene, Preface to THE CASE 
FOUNDATION, A SHORT GUIDE TO IMPACT INVESTING (2014), http://casefoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/ShortGuideToImpactInvesting-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/C39V-7T4Z] 
(noting the increasing interest in impact investing); Susan Mac Cormac, Impact Investing, MORRISON 
FOERSTER, http://www.mofo.com/special-content/impactinvesting [https://perma.cc/2CLX-MTWX] 
(listing various impact investing and social enterprise articles from the major law). 
 5. See J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited 
Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in 
Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 283 (2010). 
 6. See Eric H. Franklin, A Rational Approach to Business Entity Choice, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 
573, 591 (2016) (citing the eight states with L3C statutes in place, and noting that a ninth state, North 
Carolina, repealed its L3C statute). 
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Island passing the latest state L3C statute in 2012.7 The L3C form was 
conceived, in large part, to attract Program-Related Investments (PRIs) 
from foundations, and the statutory language mimics the IRS’s 
requirements for making proper PRIs.8 The IRS, however, failed to create 
a clear L3C safe harbor for PRIs and, consequently, interest in the form 
has waned.9 Academic criticism of L3Cs started relatively soon after the 
first state legislation passed; the criticism focused mainly on the form 
being unnecessary and not providing significant advantages in attracting 
PRIs.10 Substantively, the L3C statutes remain probably the strictest social 
enterprise law on entity purpose, requiring that the L3C “significantly 
furthers the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational 
purposes” and requiring that the L3C “would not have been formed but for 
the company’s relationship to the accomplishment of charitable or 
educational purposes.”11 Furthermore, the L3C statutes require that “[n]o 
significant purpose of the company is the production of income or the 
appreciation of property,” though the statutes explicitly state that making 
a profit is not “conclusive evidence of a significant purpose involving the 
production of income or the appreciation of property.”12 Despite such 
restrictive statutory language, approximately 1,300 L3Cs have been 
                                                     
 7. See L3C Tally, supra note 1 (showing one L3C statute newly effective in 2008, four in 2009 
(including the Oglala Sioux Tribe), three in 2010 (including North Carolina, which was later repealed), 
one in 2011, one in 2012, and one (the Navajo Tribe) in 2014). 
 8. See Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, History, Basic Construct, and Legal 
Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 15–17 (2010). 
 9. See John A. Pearce II & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Regulation of L3Cs for Social 
Entrepreneurship: A Prerequisite to Increase Utilization, 92 NEB. L. REV. 259, 261–62 (2013); Jamie 
Hopkins, Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies: High-Risk Tax Fad or Legitimate Social 
Investment Planning Opportunity?, 2014 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 35, 42–43 (2014), 
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/HOPKINS_2014_35.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
QWQ5-WMX9]. 
 10. See generally Carter G. Bishop, The Low Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by 
Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243 (2010); Cassady V. (“Cass”) Brewer, Seven Ways to 
Strengthen and Improve the L3C, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 329 (2013); J. William Callison & Allan W. 
Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially 
Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 274–75 
(2010); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” on the  
Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 879 (2010); J. Haskell Murray & 
Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and  
Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2011); 
Cass Brewer, Hybrid Business Entities in 2014, SOCENTLAWBLOG (Jan. 6, 2014), 
http://socentlaw.com/2014/01/hybrid-business-entities-in-2014/ [https://perma.cc/V4DR-H64M]; 
Anne Field, North Carolina Officially Abolishes the L3C, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2014/01/11/north-carolina-officially-abolishes-the-l3c/. 
 11. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4162 (2010); see also Cassady V. Brewer & 
Michael J. Rhim, Using the ‘L3C’ for Program-Related Investments, 21 TAX’N EXEMPTS 11, 11, 13 
(2009) (stating that the Vermont L3C statute is similar to the L3C statutes in other states). 
 12. See sources cited supra note 11. 
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formed nationwide; however, the rate of formation appears to be slowing 
and research did not uncover any publicly traded L3Cs.13 
B. Benefit Corporations, Public Benefit Corporations, and Benefit LLCs 
In 2010, two years after the passage of the first L3C statute, 
Maryland passed the first benefit corporation statute.14 Including 
Maryland, thirty states and the District of Columbia have passed benefit 
corporation or public benefit corporation statutes.15 Most states passed 
benefit corporation statutes based on the Model Benefit Corporation 
Legislation (the Model).16 However, Delaware and Colorado’s public 
benefit corporation (PBC) laws significantly depart from the Model in 
certain areas.17 Differences between the Model-based laws and the PBC 
laws are discussed in detail in another article by this author, but the 
primary differences are that, unlike the Model, PBC laws require a specific 
social purpose (instead of just a general one) and are more enabling in 
some areas than the Model, which tends to use more mandatory 
language.18 The Model requires benefit corporations to pursue a “general 
public benefit,” defined as “[a] material positive impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a  
third-party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit 
corporation,” and requires that annual public reporting be measured 
against a third-party standard; however, Delaware’s PBC law only 
requires reporting be done on a biennial basis, and both public reporting 
and the use of a third-party standard are optional.19 As another variation, 
Minnesota’s statute allows the formation of general benefit corporations 
(similar to a Model-type benefit corporation) and specific benefit 
corporations (similar to the social purpose corporations described in Part 
                                                     
 13. See Pearce & Hopkins, supra note 9, at 282 (2013) (noting that “L3Cs do not have the 
liquidity of publicly traded companies”); L3C Tally, supra note 1. 
 14. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-01 (West 2014) (effective Oct. 1, 2010). 
 15. State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://benefitcorp.net/ 
policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/5BMF-REQ4]. 
 16. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. (2016) (The current version of the model legislation is dated 
April 4, 2016, but multiple versions of the model exist and some statutes were based on earlier versions 
that were slightly different than the current model legislation.). 
 17. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-101-501 to -509 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2011 & Supp. 2015). 
 18. See J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation 
Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 347–70 (2014) (detailing the major differences between the Model 
Benefit Corporation and Delaware PBC. Note that the Delaware PBC statute has been amended since 
this 2014 article was written.). The Delaware PBC law is more flexible than the Colorado PBC law, 
given that the Colorado PBC law follows the model in its reporting requirements. Compare DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2011 & Supp. 2015), with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-101-501 to -509 
(West 2006 & Supp. 2014), and MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. (2016). 
 19. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 102, 201(a), 401–02 (2016); see Murray, supra note 18. 
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I.C below).20 Maryland and Oregon both have benefit corporation laws but 
deviate from the norm by having also passed laws allowing formation of 
benefit LLCs.21 The statutory language for benefit LLCs largely follows 
the benefit corporation language, but the statutory gaps are filled with the 
state LLC statute rather than the state corporate statute.22 As of late 2015, 
approximately 3,300 benefit entities have been formed and the benefit 
entity proponents appear to be the largest group of supporters for the social 
enterprise forms.23 
Proponents of the benefit corporation form authored a white paper 
(the Proponent White Paper) that argues that the entity type is a needed 
addition to the legal forms menu.24 The Proponent White Paper claims not 
only that the market is demanding a social enterprise legal form like the 
benefit corporation but also that “existing legal frameworks do not 
accommodate for-profit mission-driven companies” like the benefit 
corporation.25 In arguing that existing legal frameworks do not 
accommodate social enterprises, the Proponent White Paper focuses on 
Dodge v. Ford26 and Delaware cases, like Unocal and Revlon, which took 
place in the company sale context.27 The Proponent White Paper 
recognizes that “strict reading of Dodge v. Ford and other cases that 
specify shareholder wealth maximization as a fiduciary duty has been 
criticized by those who believe that these cases do not represent the current 
state of modern corporate law.”28 The Proponent White Paper attempts to 
argue, however, that “Dodge v. Ford remains good law and many still 
                                                     
 20. MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 304A (West 2011 & Supp. 2015); see infra Part I.C. 
 21. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns §§ 4a-1201 to -1208 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT.  
§§ 60.750–60.770 (2014). 
 22. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns §§ 4a-1201 to -1208 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT.  
§§ 60.750–60.770 (2014). See generally J. Haskell Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, U. CIN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017). 
 23. See J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 588 (2016). 
 24. See generally WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. & LARRY VRANKA, BENEFIT CORP., WHITE PAPER: 
THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT 
BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE 
PUBLIC, (2013), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Benefit%20Corporation%20 
White%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/JM6Y-S4MW] [hereinafter PROPONENT WHITE PAPER]. 
 25. PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 2–14. 
 26. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). In addition to Dodge v. Ford, the 
Proponent White Paper also cites Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986); 
Long v. Norwood Hills Corp., 380 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Granada Investments, Inc. v. 
DWG Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 459 (N.D. Ohio 1993). But see Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop 
Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 172–74 (2008) (arguing that Dodge v. Ford is 
bad law from both a normative and a positive position). 
 27. PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 7–14. 
 28. Id. at 7. 
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maintain that its ‘theory of shareholder wealth maximization has been 
widely accepted by courts over an extended period of time.’”29 
The Proponent White Paper argues for benefit corporation statutes 
in both constituency and nonconstituency statute states. Regarding 
constituency statute states, the Proponent White Paper claims that there is 
scant case law interpreting constituency statutes, that constituency statutes 
are vague and do not state how much weight to place on different 
stakeholders, and that other constituencies do not have standing to sue.30 
In nonconstituency statute states, like Delaware, the Proponent White 
Paper examines three contexts: (1) day-to-day decisions, (2) takeover 
defense decisions, and (3) change of control decisions.31 In the day-to-day 
context, the Proponent White Paper argues that even though these are the 
kind of decisions protected by the business judgment rule and of the kind 
that allow “directors [to] enjoy most discretion,” the law requires that these 
“decisions must show some connection to shareholder value.”32 The 
Proponent White Paper also notes that some mission-driven companies 
will make decisions that “might result in a diminishment of shareholder 
value, even over the long term,” and that those types of decisions 
knowingly embracing below-market terms may not be allowed under 
current law.33 In the takeover defense and company sale situations, the 
Proponent White Paper notes the increased focus on shareholders’ 
                                                     
 29. Id. at 8 (quoting STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 9.2 at 
413 (2002)). 
 30. Id. at 9–10. Interestingly, the benefit corporation statutes suffer from nearly all of those 
mentioned flaws: even less case law exists regarding benefit corporation statutes than constituency 
statutes; the benefit corporation statutes give little guidance to directors; the statutes do not specify the 
weight to be applied to different stakeholders; and while a third-party standard is required, the statutes 
provided little information about what the third-party standard should contain or how courts should 
use the standard in analyzing director conduct. The benefit corporation statutes do not expressly 
provide outside constituencies with standing to sue as a default. The Proponent White Paper notes 
“permissive constituency statutes only create the option (and not the requirement) for directors to 
consider interests of constituencies other than shareholders. . . . Mission-driven executives and 
investors are often in minority shareholder positions and would prefer that directors and officers be 
required to consider these expanded interests when making decisions.” Id. at 10. The Proponent White 
Paper does not discuss when or why minority shareholders should be prioritized over majority 
shareholders and does not discuss whether a traditional corporation in a constituency statute state could 
mandate nonshareholder constituency consideration in the firm’s articles of incorporation. 
 31. Id. at 11; see also J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, 
Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 10–17 (2012) (discussing 
the different legal standards at play depending on the type of decision facing directors). 
 32. PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 12 (emphasis added); see also, Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 109–29 (2004) 
(providing justifications for a powerful, abstention-style business judgment rule). 
 33. PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 12. Specifically, the authors of the Proponent 
White Paper appear concerned that “a judge may not find it to be appropriate to consider and advance 
non-shareholder interests for their own sake (i.e., as part of the company’s mission) and not as a way 
of maximizing long-term shareholder financial value.” Id. at 14. 
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financial interests by the courts in Unocal34 and Revlon35 respectively.36 
The Proponent White Paper admits that these cases may be distinguished 
and navigated around, but it insists that the uncertainty in the law can lead 
to lawsuits if the firm focuses on the financial interests of shareholders.37 
The Proponent White Paper admits that some commentators have 
thoughtfully argued that one might be able to include a social purpose in a 
firm’s certificate of incorporation to avoid the aforementioned issues, but 
claims that there is no clear statutory or case law on point, which 
supposedly makes firms nervous.38 
The rationales for benefit corporations summarized above and 
documented by the Proponent White Paper can or have been challenged, 
but they remain relevant for this Article and will be picked up again in the 
                                                     
 34. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). In Unocal, the business 
judgment rule is applied only if “the directors can first demonstrate that they were responding to a 
legitimate threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, and that their response was ‘reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed.’” PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 12 (quoting Unocal, 493 
A.2d at 949). The Proponent White Paper seemed especially concerned about the language in eBay v. 
Newmark which, in the Unocal context, stated: “Directors of a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot 
deploy a [policy] to defend a business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth 
maximization—at least not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware law.” eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010). The Proponent White Paper also 
appears concerned that “Delaware courts will seek to limit the ‘purely philanthropic ends’ of mission-
driven companies, especially when their directors’ decisions are reviewed under Unocal’s scrutiny.” 
PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 13. But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: 
Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 772 (2006) (citing academics who 
have called Unocal a “toothless standard”). 
 35. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 36. PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 12–13. 
 37. Id. at 13. But see Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law 
and the Sale of A Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 235–37 (2010) (explaining how “Revlon 
duties” can be avoided and how directors may be able to “just say no” to bids for the company); Lyman 
Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 224–25 (2013) 
(arguing that Revlon is diminishing in importance in Delaware law and arguing that courts should 
“reject Revlon’s faulty focus on short-term value maximization”). 
 38. PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 13. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (West 
2016) (“A corporation may be incorporated or organized . . . to conduct or promote any lawful business 
or purposes.”). In California, Professor Eric Talley and Jesse Finfrock argued that “the state does not 
permit flexibility in the statement of a corporate purpose within a corporate charter, constraining 
incorporators instead to utilize a stock set of phrases that do not clearly admit social entrepreneurship 
goals.” Jesse Finfrock & Eric Talley, Social Entrepreneurship and Uncorporations, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1867, 1870 (2014). This limitation in California law, coupled with the absence of a constituency 
statute, “made it impossible for a for-profit California-incorporated firm to embrace social 
entrepreneurship goals in its core governing constitution.” Id. While Talley and Finfrock note the 
strong protection of the business judgment rule in California, like the Proponent White Paper authors, 
they argue that the protection is limited, stating that “[w]hile the rule grants fiduciaries discretion about 
how to serve their shareholder interests, it arguably does not give discretion about whether to do so. 
Consequently, for decisions that patently sacrifice shareholder welfare for the benefit of other 
considerations (including social purposes), even the BJR provides wavering protection.” Id. (emphasis 
in original). The California benefit corporation and social purpose corporation legislation was passed, 
at least in part, to address these issues. Id. 
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discussions about how investment professionals should treat benefit 
corporations below.39 
C. Social Purpose Corporations 
In 2011, California passed a flexible purpose corporation statute, 
which was later renamed a social purpose corporation (SPC) statute.40 
Washington is the only other state with a similar SPC statute.41 The 
defining feature of the SPC statute is its flexibility in entity purpose.42 The 
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation requires a general public purpose 
but, in contrast, the SPC allows the required purpose to be significantly 
narrower.43 Like benefit corporation statutes, SPC statutes require regular 
social reporting.44 Accurate figures on the number of SPCs are not readily 
available, but only twenty-three flexible purpose corporations (later called 
SPCs) were formed in California in 2012, and it would be surprising if the 
number of SPCs in both California and Washington has exceeded 300 
entities at the time of this publication.45 
II. THE STATE OF SOCIAL INVESTING 
Social investing has various facets. This Part begins by briefly 
describing the related, but different, concepts of impact investing and 
investing that considers environmental, social, and governance factors 
(ESG factors). This Part then narrows its focus to consider the place of 
social enterprise legal forms, which currently only occupy a small portion 
of the overall social investing landscape. 
                                                     
 39. See generally J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit 
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U. 
BUS. L. REV. 85 (2012); Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate 
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007 (2013); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social 
Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012); Dana 
Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 591 (2011). 
 40. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–2517, 2600–2605, 2700–2702, 2800, 2900, 3000–3002, 3100, 
3200–3203, 3300–3306, 3400–3401, 3500–3503 (West 2014). 
 41. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23B.25.005 to .150 (West 2013). 
 42. J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 552 (2016) 
(explaining that the SPCs “do not require a general public benefit purpose but do require adoption of 
one or more specific purposes”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 89, 107–08 (2015) (discussing the SPC reporting requirements under Washington and 
California law). 
 45. Finfrock & Talley, supra note 38, at 1874–75 (noting that the benefit corporations and FPCs 
formed during 2012 make up “less than two-tenths of a percent of the new incorporations within 
California during [2012]”). 
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A. Impact Investing and ESG Factors 
Impact investing has been defined a number of different ways, but 
the authors of perhaps the leading book on the topic state that “impact 
investors intend to create positive impact alongside various levels of 
financial return, both managing and measuring the blended value they 
create.”46 Stated differently, the Global Impact Investment Network 
(GIIN), a leading nonprofit that supports development of the impact 
investment industry, opines that “[i]mpact investments are investments 
made into companies, organizations, and funds with the intention to 
generate social and environmental impact alongside a financial return. 
Impact investments can be made in both emerging and developed markets, 
and target a range of returns from below-market to market-rate, depending 
upon the circumstances.”47 Like the definition of impact investing, 
estimates of market size vary, but one survey of 146 impact investors 
administered by J.P. Morgan found impact investments in the amount of 
$10.6 billion in 2014, with the intention to increase them to $12.2 billion 
in 2015, and a total of approximately $60 billion of impact investments 
under management.48 
While impact investors generally understand social impact as critical 
to their investments, many more managers at least consider ESG factors.49 
More than 1,400 companies have signed the Principles for Responsible 
Investment, which includes a commitment to promoting disclosure on 
ESG factors and considering ESG factors when making investments.50 
Worldwide, approximately $45 trillion in assets are reportedly being 
managed with a commitment to incorporate ESG factors into the 
investment decision-making process, though the estimated amount varies 
depending on the source and their estimation methods.51 
                                                     
 46. ANTONY BUGG-LEVINE & JED EMERSON, IMPACT INVESTING: TRANSFORMING HOW WE 
MAKE MONEY WHILE MAKING A DIFFERENCE (2011). 
 47. What is Impact Investing, GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK (GIIN) (2016), 
https://thegiin.org/impact-investing/need-to-know/#s1 [https://perma.cc/9A5W-L6HT]. 
 48. Yasemin Saltuk & Ali El Idrissi, Eyes on the Horizon, The Impact Investor Survey 5, GLOBAL 
IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK (May 4, 2015), https://thegiin.org/assets/documents/pub/ 
2015.04%20Eyes%20on%20the%20Horizon.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJ3B-6QXN]. 
 49. Reiser, supra note 2, at 739 n.202 (2013) (discussing some of the definition of impact 
investing. Each definition either considers social impact to be an important factor or the most important 
factor in investment decisions). But see David A. Levitt, Impact Investing through a Donor Advised 
Fund, 25 TAX’N EXEMPTS 3, 4 (2014) (noting that “there is no legal definition of a mission-related or 
impact investment, and no legal requirements to qualify for this status”). 
 50. About the PRI, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTING, https://www.unpri.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/JDA8-N7B4]; Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmin Sethi, Engagement: The Missing 
Middle Approach in the Bebchuk-Strine Debate, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 385, 399–400 (2016). 
 51. Deborah Burand, Resolving Impact Investment Disputes: When Doing Good Goes Bad, 48 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 60 (2015) (citing SOCIAL IMPACT INVESTMENT TASKFORCE, IMPACT 
INVESTMENT: THE INVISIBLE HEART OF MARKETS 1 (2014)); see also US SIF: THE FORUM FOR 
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B. Publicly Traded Social Enterprises 
Most businesses legally organized as social enterprises appear to be 
smaller private companies.52 In 2015, Laureate Education, Inc. filed an  
S-1 to set up the first benefit corporation initial public offering in the 
United States.53 Laureate Education is also the largest benefit corporation, 
with more than $4 billion in revenue from 88 institutions, 28 countries, 
and 1 million students.54 Plum Organics, a Delaware PBC, is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of publicly traded Campbell Soup Company.55 Further, 
French company Danone recently acquired WhiteWave Food for roughly 
$10 billion and reportedly plans to use a Delaware PBC for WhiteWave’s 
operations.56 
Other publicly traded benefit corporations are supposedly in the 
works. Further, publicly traded, certified B Corporation Etsy will have to 
become a benefit corporation, reincorporate in a constituency-statute state, 
or lose its certification unless the nonprofit organization in charge of 
certification, B Lab, changes its rules regarding certified B corporations.57 
The other social enterprise forms, such as social purpose corporations, 
                                                     
SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND 
IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS 2014 12 (10th ed.), http://www.ussif.org/Files/Publications/ 
SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdf [https://perma.cc/A65N-GM38] (showing $6.2 billion in U.S.-domiciled 
assets in institutions “that apply various environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria in their 
investment analysis and portfolio selection”). 
 52. Find a Benefit Corp., BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net/ [https://perma.cc/5EW8-
36BH ] (providing a database of benefit corporations, most of which appear to be relatively young and 
relatively small companies, with some exceptions); L3C Tally, supra note 1 (providing a list of L3Cs, 
which appear to be mostly small companies). 
 53. Alicia Plerhoples, First Benefit Corporation IPO, SOCENTLAW (Oct. 5, 2015), 
http://socentlaw.com/2015/10/first-benefit-corporation-ipo/ [https://perma.cc/5HAG-2V97]; 
Registration Statement: Form S-1, PRACTICAL LAW, http://us.practicallaw.com/0-381-0950 
[https://perma.cc/JW3C-76NE] (noting that “Form S-1 is the registration statement form most 
commonly used by domestic companies selling securities to the public for the first time”). 
 54. FAQ: Investing, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net/faq [https://perma.cc/YA25-
BAEQ]. 
 55. Plum Organics, BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/community/plum-
organics [https://perma.cc/27HU-NAC2]. 
 56. Danone Swallows WhiteWave in $10B Bid to Go Organic, ORGANIC CONSUMERS ASS’N 
(July 7, 2016), https://www.organicconsumers.org/news/danone-swallows-whitewave-10b-bid-go-
organic [https://perma.cc/R9HV-HW9Z]; E-mail from Rick Alexander, B Lab (July 11, 2016, 06:22 
CST) (on file with author). 
 57. Haskell Murray, Etsy’s Dilemma, BUS. LAW PROF BLOG (March 20, 2015), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2015/03/etsys-dilemma-.html [https://perma.cc/ 
GGB9-5JNT]; Haskell Murray, Certified B Corporations v. Benefit Corporations, CONGLOMERATE 
(May 3, 2012), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/05/certified-b-corporations-v-benefit-
corporations.html [https://perma.cc/EPM6-K7J5] (explaining the differences between B corporation 
certification (a private certification awarded by B Lab after a test and payment of a fee) and the legal 
status of a benefit corporation (one of the options for legal entity status provided by certain states and 
obtained through incorporating under one of the benefit corporation statutes)). 
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Benefit LLCs, and L3Cs, currently have no known publicly traded 
companies. 
C. Private, Outside Funding of Social Enterprises 
Data on businesses formed under social enterprise statutes that have 
received venture capital, private equity, or other private, outside funding 
is difficult to uncover. A few of the known companies are detailed here. 
Alliant International University, a California benefit corporation, is funded 
and controlled by Bertelsmann, a large, German mass-media company.58 
AltSchool, a Delaware public benefit corporation, raised $100 million 
from Andreessen Horowitz, Founders Fund, Learn Capital, and First 
Round Capital in 2015.59 Farmigo, a Delaware public benefit corporation, 
raised a total of $26 million from investment firms Formation 8, 
Benchmark, and Sherbrooke Capital.60 Yerdle, a California benefit 
corporation, raised $5 million in Series-A financing from venture capital 
funds including, The Westly Group, Mindful Investors, and DBL 
Investors.61 Ello, a Delaware public benefit corporation, raised $5.5 
million from Freshtracks Capital, Bullet Time Ventures, and Foundry 
Group.62 Cotopaxi, a Delaware public benefit corporation, raised $6.5 
million in a Series-A raise led by the venture capital firm Greycroft 
Partners.63 Year Up Professional Resources (YUPRO) is a Delaware 
public benefit corporation that received $4.5 million investment from 
                                                     
 58. Doug Lederman, Blurring the Nonprofit/For-Profit Divide, INSIDE HIGH. ED (Feb. 23, 2015), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/02/23/nonprofit-university-becomes-benefit-
corporation-further-blurring-profit-divide [https://perma.cc/A7ZR-AYEH]; Kristin DeCarr, 
Bertelsmann Takes Controlling Stake in Alliant, EDUC. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.educationnews.org/higher-education/bertelsmann-takes-controlling-stake-in-alliant/ 
[https://perma.cc/LP5F-D3GN]; E-mail from Jonathan S. Storper, Hanson Bridgett LLP (June 9, 2016, 
20:27 CST) (on file with author). 
 59. Benefit Corporations Raising Capital, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net/benefit-
corporations-raising-capital [https://perma.cc/3LG3-WHDN]. 
 60. Anthony Ha, Farmigo Raises $16M For A New Approach To The Farmers’ Market, TECH 
CRUNCH (Sept. 30, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/09/30/farmigo-series-b/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Z6NQ-VXN7]; RSF Capital Management Registers as One of Delaware’s first Benefit Corporations!, 
RSF SOC. FIN. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://rsfsocialfinance.org/2013/08/01/rsf-de-benefit-corporation/ 
[https://perma.cc/W5J5-ESWK] (listing some of the first Delaware public benefit corporations, 
including Farmigo, and the major investors in those companies). 
 61. Benefit Corporations Raising Capital, supra note 59. 
 62. Id.; Haskell Murray, Ello and Social Enterprise, BUS. LAW PROF BLOG (Oct. 24, 2014), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/10/ello-and-social-enterprise.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZXZ6-GVSF]. 
 63. Benefit Corporations Raising Capital, supra note 59; BENEFIT CORPORATION REPORT, 
COTOPAXI, https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0281/7544/files/Cotopaxi-2015-Benefit-Corporation-
Report.pdf?6577560737617330421 [https://perma.cc/8CB4-BPM4] (noting the company’s legal 
status as a Delaware public benefit corporation, though they incorrectly use the term “benefit 
corporation,” rather than “public benefit corporation”). 
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Venture Philanthropy Partners, “a nonprofit philanthropic investment 
organization,” in 2009, before YUPRO converted to a PBC.64 Method, a 
Delaware public benefit corporation, was supported in its transition to a 
Delaware public benefit corporation by Ecover, its acquirer, in 2013.65 
Beta Bionics, a Massachusetts benefit corporation, raised $5 million 
dollars from Eli Lilly in 2016.66 Maine’s Own Organic (MOO) Milk, a 
Vermont-organized L3C, raised more than $3.9 million in 2013 (bringing 
the total amount raised close to $6 million), before winding down 
operations in 2014.67 
There are quite a number of investment providers that are specifically 
interested in the social investing space, including Acumen Fund, Gray 
Ghost Ventures, Root Capital, RSF Social Finance, Slow Money, and 
Village Capital. However, these investment organizations do not appear to 
be exclusively focused on businesses that have utilized the social 
enterprise legal forms.68 In addition, some of the investment organizations, 
like RSF Capital Management, PBC (a wholly owned subsidiary of RSF 
Social Finance) and Flexible Capital Fund, L3C, are organized as social 
enterprises themselves.69 
                                                     
 64. Press Release, Year Up, Year Up and VPP Enter $4.5 Million Investment Partnership  
(Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.yearup.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/YearUpVPP_pr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8UAS-8UEK]. 
 65. Ryan Honeyman, Can B Corp Certification Help You Raise Capital?, TRIPLE PUNDIT  
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.triplepundit.com/2014/09/can-b-corp-certification-help-raise-capital/# 
[https://perma.cc/AC82-M38U]. 
 66. Beta Bionics Raises $5 Million, TERRIER TECH (Apr. 5, 2016), 
http://blogs.bu.edu/otd/2016/04/05/beta-bionics-raises-5/ [https://perma.cc/269A-L37Z]. 
 67. Jessica Hall, MOOMilk Attracts $3.9 Million in New Investment, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD 
(May 29, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/2013/05/29/moo-milk/; J. Craig Anderson, Maine’s 
MOO Milk to Shut Down, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (May 16, 2014), 
http://www.pressherald.com/2014/05/16/maine_s_own_organic_milk__known_as_moo__to_shut_d
own_/ [https://perma.cc/V6V3-26R6] (noting the private funding raised and the large amount of 
investor money to be lost). 
 68. MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN ENTREPRENEURS  
188–201 (2011) (providing descriptions and listings of funding sources for social enterprises). 
 69. RSF Capital Management, PBC, BCORPORATION.NET, https://www.bcorporation.net/ 
community/rsf-capital-management [https://perma.cc/4LC5-G9RC]; Flexible Capital Fund Invests 
$600,000 in Royalty Financing to Two Growing Vermont Companies, VT. SUSTAINABLE JOBS FUND 
(Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.vsjf.org/news/96/flexible-capital-fund-invests-600000-in-royalty-
financing-to-two-growing-vermont-companies [https://perma.cc/63CV-YN2F]. 
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III. ERISA AND ECONOMICALLY TARGETED INVESTMENTS 
A.  ERISA Title I, Sections 403 and 404 
Sections 403 and 404 of ERISA require plan fiduciaries to act for the 
exclusive benefit of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries.70 
Specifically, Section 404 requires that a plan fiduciary “discharge his 
duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries” and requires “care, skill, prudence, and diligence” and 
diversification.71 Under the text of Sections 403 and 404, it is not entirely 
clear whether ETI investments made for financial returns and collateral 
social benefits were appropriate for plan investments or would be subject 
to special scrutiny.72 The following sections in this Part analyze guidance 
from the DOL on this issue. 
B. Interpretive Bulletin of 1994 
In 1994, under the Clinton Administration,73 the DOL issued 
Interpretive Bulletin 1994-1 (IB 94-1), which “corrected a misperception 
that investments in ETIs are incompatible with ERISA’s fiduciary 
obligations.”74 IB 94-1 was commonly called the “all things being equal” 
test because plan fiduciaries were permitted to consider the social benefits 
                                                     
 70. Peter E. Haller & Peter J. Allman, DOL Clarifies Guidance on Economically Targeted 
Investments, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.willkie.com/~/media/ 
Files/Publications/2015/10/DOL_Clarifies_Guidance_on_Economically_Targeted_Investments.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SC67-YLCK]. See generally Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto 
& Anne M. Tucker, Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 73 (2015). 
 71. ERISA § 404(a)(1) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)) (emphasis added); see also Edward 
A. Zelinsky, The Continuing Battle Over Economically Targeted Investments: An Analysis of DOL 
Interpretive Bulletin 2015-01, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 3–4 (2016) (explaining the text of section 
404). 
 72. Tom Perez, United States Secretary of Labor, Press Conference Announcing New ERISA 
Guidance on Economically Targeted Investments (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/_sec/ 
media/speeches/20151022_Perez.htm [https://perma.cc/AKF2-DMZP] (noting that ETI “is known by 
a number of terms—’environmental, social and governance’, or ESG, investing; sustainable and 
responsible investing, impact investing.”). 
 73. The administrations under which the guidance was issued are important to note, because as 
Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein wrote roughly twenty years ago, “[t]he ongoing debate over economically 
targeted investments is primarily about power and politics and only secondarily about pensions.” Jayne 
Elizabeth Zanglein, Protecting Retirees While Encouraging Economically Targeted Investments, 5 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 47 (1996); see also Rado Bohinc & Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate 
Governance in Post-Privatized Slovenia, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 49, 64 (2001) (noting the politicization 
of public pensions and social investing). 
 74. New Guidance on Economically Targeted Investments in Retirement Plans from US Labor 
Department, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/ebsa20152045.htm 
[https://perma.cc/DJ2R-NQ9W] [hereinafter New Guidance on Economically Targeted Investments]. 
See generally, Edward A. Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments: A Critical Analysis, 6 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39 (1997); Zanglein, supra note 73. 
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of an investment, if the financial returns were projected to be equal to or 
better than alternative investments.75 Edward Zelinsky opined that  
“IB 94-1 encouraged employee benefit trusts to make social investments 
designated as ETIs” because it stated that ETIs may be properly selected 
for their collateral social benefits, without violating the applicable duty of 
loyalty, if those investments are prudent investments.76 
C. Interpretive Bulletin of 2008 
Effective October 17, 2008, under the George W. Bush 
Administration, the DOL issued Interpretive Bulletin 2008-01 (IB 08-01), 
which stated that “ERISA’s plain text does not permit fiduciaries to make 
investment decisions on the basis of any factor other than the economic 
interest of the plan.”77 IB 08-01 replaced IB 94-1 and made clear that 
“fiduciaries may never subordinate the economic interests of the plan to 
unrelated objectives.”78 Later, however, IB 08-01 noted that in situations 
where multiple investments were equal from an economic perspective, 
fiduciaries were free to use other factors, such as ESG factors, as a 
tiebreaker.79 IB 08-01 warned “that fiduciary consideration of 
noneconomic factors should be rare,” and that collateral considerations 
could only be considered “in very limited circumstances.”80 Causing some 
concern, IB 08-01 cautioned that it would be difficult to rely on 
noneconomic factors and stay in compliance with the strict ERISA 
guidelines “absent a written record demonstrating that a contemporaneous 
economic analysis showed that the investment alternatives were of equal 
value.”81 As U.S. Secretary of Labor Tom Perez noted, “Even if the ‘all 
                                                     
 75. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder 
Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1079–80 (1998); Craig A. Bitman & Michael B. 
Richman, DOL Issues New Guidance on Economically Targeted Investments, MORGAN LEWIS (Nov. 
5, 2015), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/dol-issues-new-guidance-on-economically-targeted-
investments [https://perma.cc/75ZQ-89J6] (noting that IB 94-01 “set forth the ‘all things being equal’ 
test”); Perez, supra note 72 (stating that ETI “is known by a number of terms—‘environmental, social 
and governance’, or ESG, investing; sustainable and responsible investing, impact investing.”); Geczy, 
Jeffers, Musto & Tucker, supra note 70, at 86–87 (noting that IB 94-01 did not allow fiduciaries to 
take lower returns and/or greater risk to invest in ETIs). 
 76. See Zelinsky, supra note 71, at 6. 
 77. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Investing in Economically Targeted Investments, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 61734, 61735 (Oct. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509) [hereinafter IB 08-01]. 
 78. Id.; New Guidance on Economically Targeted Investments, supra note 74. 
 79. IB 08-01, supra note 77. 
 80. Id.; Perez, supra note 72; Bitman & Richman, supra note 75. See generally Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Interpretive Bulletin 08-1 and Economically Targeted Investing: A Missed Opportunity, 82 
S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 11 (2009). 
 81. IB 08-01, supra note 77; Susan Mac Cormac et al., Department of Labor Clarifies ERISA 
Fiduciary Requirements With Respect to Economically Targeted Investments and Environmental, 
Social, and Governance Goals, MORRISON FOERSTER (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.mofo.com/~/ 
media/Files/ClientAlert/2015/11/151112DepartmentofLaborClarifiesERISA.pdf 
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things being equal test’ nominally hadn’t changed [after the issuance of IB 
08-01], in many quarters it was understood to have changed . . . . The 2008 
guidance gave cooties to impact investing.”82 
D. Interpretive Bulletin of 2015 
On October 26, 2015, under the Obama Administration, the DOL 
issued Interpretive Bulletin 2015-01 (IB 15-01) to clarify what it 
considered confusion and misinterpretation of the DOL’s intent in  
IB 08-01.83 The DOL concluded that “IB 2008-01 has unduly discouraged 
fiduciaries from considering ETIs and ESG factors.”84 Specifically, the 
DOL was concerned that IB 08-01 discouraged plan fiduciaries from 
considering ETIs and ESG factors even if ETIs were equal or better 
economically and even when only using the permissible ESG factors to 
determine economic value of the investments.85 In IB 15-01, the DOL 
sought to make clear that a plan fiduciary may, and should, consider ESG 
factors that “potentially influence risk and return.”86 Also, IB 15-01 made 
clear that “[f]iduciaries need not treat commercially reasonable 
investments as inherently suspect or in need of special scrutiny merely 
because they take into consideration environmental, social, or other 
factors.”87 Further, if an investment is justified on its economic merits, 
collateral goals are not needed as tiebreakers.88 The DOL clarified that 
additional documentation was not presumptively necessary for ETIs or 
when considering ESG factors; rather, appropriate documentation depends 
on the facts and circumstances of each investment decision.89 The DOL 
reaffirmed that plan fiduciaries must stay focused on the economic 
benefits of investments: “an investment will not be prudent if it would be 
expected to provide a plan with a lower rate of return than available 
alternative investments with commensurate degrees of risk or is riskier 
                                                     
[https://perma.cc/Q4QW-A2C4] (noting that some worried that IB 2008 required additional record-
keeping, above and beyond those kept for normal investment decisions. In 2015, the DOL clarified 
that making ESG investments does not presumptively require additional documentation). 
 82. Perez, supra note 72. 
 83. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in Considering 
Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65135-01 (Oct. 26, 2015) [hereinafter IB 15-01]. 
 84. IB 15-01, supra note 83. 
 85. Id.; Haller & Allman, supra note 70 (noting, however, that ESG factors need to be considered 
for their economic impact). 
 86. IB 15-01, supra note 83; Perez, supra note 72 (commenting on IB 2015, Secretary Perez 
stated, “[j]ust because a project has social impact, that should not be a strike against it. Nor should it 
be a decisive argument for it”). 
 87. IB 15-01, supra note 83. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.; Haller & Allman, supra note 70 (stating that the “new guidance also makes clear that 
fiduciaries are not required to maintain any special or additional documentation to demonstrate 
compliance with ERISA’s fiduciary rules when considering ETIs or ESG factors”). 
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than alternative available investments with commensurate rates of 
return.”90 Finally, through IB 15-01, the DOL withdrew IB 08-01 and 
reinstated IB 94-1, hopefully removing the stigma from ETIs without 
elevating them above other investments.91 
IV. WALKING THE LINE: PROFIT AND PURPOSE 
ETIs have long been a source of debate among ERISA scholars. 
Some argue for disallowing any nonfinancial considerations while others 
argue for allowing nonfinancial considerations that do not negatively 
impact the economic returns.92 Firms that choose a social enterprise legal 
form, such as a benefit corporation, may place even more tension between 
profit and purpose than a typical ETI.93 As explained below, ERISA 
trustees should be cautious with new social enterprise forms because the 
social enterprise statutes were passed, at least in part, to allow directors to 
sacrifice profits for purpose.94 Benefit corporations, and other social 
enterprises, however, may choose not to sacrifice profits, but rather may 
use the publicity of their social entity status to attract customers and 
employees, leading to a stronger financial bottom line. Accordingly, 
investment professionals should closely monitor and evaluate the 
strategies of social enterprises and, in cases where ERISA applies, be sure 
to invest only in social enterprises that pursue a strategy aimed at 
achieving a full market return. 
                                                     
 90. IB 15-01, supra note 83. 
 91. Haller & Allman, supra note 70; Perez, supra note 72 (making clear that IB 2015 “is not a 
thumb on the [social impact] side of the scale. What we’re doing today in no way compromises the 
financial health of retirement plans or their participants. . . . Indeed, today’s announcement reaffirms 
that ERISA fiduciaries may not accept lower returns or incur greater risks in the name of collateral 
benefits.”). 
 92. See infra Part IV.A. 
 93. Reiser, supra note 2, at 684 (“[E]ventually there will have to be decisions where profit and 
social good come into conflict and must be traded off.”); John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of 
Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 
117, 117–18 (2010) (noting the seemingly irreconcilable conflict in the purpose of serving shareholder 
interests and the purpose of serving other stakeholder interests in social enterprises); cf. Barnali 
Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm, 
11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631, 646–47 (2009) (noting that “corporate managers should also be able to serve 
both the financial interests of shareholders and the interests of non-shareholder corporate constituents 
through use of the ambiguity of the corporate purpose. . . . [T]he lack of clarity in the corporate purpose 
suggests corporate law can neither commit itself to an exclusive profit maximization mandate nor to 
operating as a vehicle for the creation of societal wealth. The truth of the corporate purpose must, then, 
somehow lie between these two positions.” But admitting that it may be the case that “both masters 
cannot always be served at the same time.”). 
 94. See supra Part I.B.  
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A. Economically Targeted Investments and ERISA 
The debate over ETIs and ERISA significantly predates discussion 
of social enterprises.95 Edward Zelinsky has spoken out against ETIs as 
inappropriate under ERISA, and has opined that  
[e]conomically targeted investing contravenes ERISA’s duty of 
loyalty by permitting, indeed encouraging, plan trustees to invest plan 
assets to generate ancillary benefits for persons other than the 
participants whose labor is embodied in those assets. . . . 
Economically targeted investing is neither a coherent concept nor a 
concept compatible with ERISA’s duty of loyalty.96  
On the other hand, Jane Elizabeth Zanglein has argued that “[t]he prudence 
rule sufficiently protects retirees from inappropriate, below-market 
investments” and, therefore, ETI investing should be allowed when the 
investment risk and returns are equivalent to other available options.97 
Zelinsky replies that ERISA’s Section 404 states that “a fiduciary shall 
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the 
participants and beneficiaries,” and “solely means solely.”98 Zelinsky is 
not convinced that trustees can put their personal social preferences aside; 
he writes that he would prefer trustees to “flip a coin” when choosing 
among economically identical investments because that would “not 
introduce into the decisionmaking process considerations which, 
unconsciously or deliberately, can skew that process.”99 Scholars seem to 
agree, however, that under ERISA, financial returns cannot be 
intentionally sacrificed for collateral benefits to third parties and society 
at large.100 
B. Social Enterprise, Benefit Corporations, and ERISA  
Due to benefit corporations being the most popular social enterprise 
entity type and the only type currently attracting publicly traded firms, this 
                                                     
 95. See, e.g., Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate Finance, 
85 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 31–32 (1997); Zanglein, supra note 73; Zelinsky, supra note 74. 
 96. Zelinsky, supra note 80, at 12. 
 97. Zanglein, supra note 73, at 55. 
 98. ERISA § 404(a)(1) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)) (emphasis added); see Zelinsky, 
supra note 71, at 10–13 (writing that “[t]rustees must pursue beneficiaries’ interests ‘solely’ and 
‘exclusively.’ Anything less opens the door of the fiduciary decisionmaking process to influences 
which are potentially detrimental to the beneficiaries’ welfare.”). 
 99. See Zelinsky, supra note 71, at 12. 
 100. As a normative matter, however, David Webber has argued that trustees should be allowed 
to consider the personal and professional interests of investors, not merely their financial interests. 
David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106,  
2126–56 (2014). 
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section will focus on benefit corporations.101 A main justification for the 
benefit corporation statutory scheme is that it more clearly allows 
decisions that will benefit various stakeholders but will not benefit 
shareholders, even in the long run.102 If social entrepreneurs were only 
attempting to make decisions that would benefit nonshareholders in the  
short-run but redound to the benefit of shareholders in the long-run, the 
traditional corporate form would be sufficient given the protection of the 
business judgment rule.103 Even in the takeover defense and company sale 
situations, firms could pursue social ends that arguably have a positive 
long-term result for shareholders by “just saying no,” retaining high voting 
shares, or simply incorporating in a constituency statute state.104 Thus, the 
pitch that benefit corporation proponents have to make to states 
considering this entity legislation is that, in essence, benefit corporations 
are needed for the times when for-profit firms want to admit to pursuing 
social ends at the short and long-term expense of shareholders.105 
ERISA fiduciaries, on the other hand, can only make economically 
targeted investments when the expected financial return is equal to or 
greater than other available options.106 This profit-focused expectation 
makes benefit corporations risky bets for ERISA fiduciaries. The 
empirical findings on returns for social investments are mixed, and we are 
too early in the benefit corporation history to have convincing data on the 
returns of these firms.107 As shown, benefit corporations are only needed, 
                                                     
 101. See supra Part I. 
 102. See supra Part I.B. 
 103. Alina Ball, Social Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2016). 
 104. See, e.g., Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and 
the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 233–42 (2010) (discussing the many ways 
Ben & Jerry’s could have avoided “selling out” to Unilever, in, perhaps, the most discussed social 
business acquisition of the last twenty-five years). 
 105. Granted, there are other arguments that benefit corporation proponents could make, such as 
the benefit corporation statutes are useful because they require consideration of major stakeholders, 
drafting of regular social reports, and use of a third-party standard to measure social impact. All of 
these things, however, could be required by a traditional for-profit firm, as long as decisions were tied 
to shareholder interests in some way; the need for benefit corporations is most clear when firms wish 
to subordinate shareholder interests, both in the short- and long-term. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our 
Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
135, 155 (2012) (“I do not mean to imply that the corporate law requires directors to maximize short-
term profits for stockholders. Rather, I simply indicate that the corporate law requires directors, as a 
matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders. 
The directors, of course, retain substantial discretion, outside the context of a change of control, to 
decide how best to achieve that goal and the appropriate time frame for delivering those returns.”). 
 106. See supra Part III. 
 107. See Rado Bohinc & Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance in  
Post-Privatized Slovenia, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 49, 64 (2001) (“[S]ocial investing has substantial costs 
in the form of reduced returns to investors. In general, the greater the extent to which a public pension 
fund is subject to direct political control, the worse its investment returns.”); David Hess, Public 
Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next Frontier of Corporate Governance: 
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as a matter of corporate law, to provide shelter for firms that wish to openly 
sacrifice profits in pursuit of social ends.108 To be clear, profit-focused 
firms may choose the benefit corporation form solely for marketing and 
financial purposes, and that would not pose the same risk to ERISA 
fiduciaries. Moreover, considering nonshareholder constituents in 
decision-making does not doom benefit corporations to below-market 
returns, and an ERISA fiduciary may be able to claim that such a holistic 
approach to the corporation is financially beneficial in the long term. In 
the company sale area, the benefit corporation statute sets entities up to 
potentially capture significantly less capital because they must consider a 
wide range of stakeholders. Unlike most constituency statutes, which are 
permissive, benefit corporation statutes are mandatory, and benefit 
corporations risk lawsuits from activist shareholders if they do not 
properly consider (or balance) stakeholder interests.109 Thus, directors, 
fearing lawsuits from activist shareholders, for not properly considering 
stakeholders, may take a lower bid for the company.110 Even if benefit 
corporation directors take the highest financial offer, they face a more 
significant litigation risk than traditional corporations from shareholders 
unhappy with the consideration and ultimate treatment of nonshareholder 
constituents.111 In the sale context, benefit corporations could first switch 
to a traditional corporation with a two-thirds vote; this ability, however, 
                                                     
Sustainable Economic Development, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 221, 260 (2007) (“Although some early 
studies showed that ETIs had a negative impact on pension performance, these studies used data from 
before the mid-1990s, when the Department of Labor issued a statement that ETIs were appropriate if 
the expected rate of return was comparable to that of alternative investments of a similar risk. More 
recent studies, including those using data after the Department of Labor’s announcement, have not 
found a negative relationship between the use of ETIs and fund performance.”); Terrance P. McGuire, 
A Blueprint for Growth or A Recipe for Disaster? State Sponsored Venture Capital Funds for High 
Technology Ventures, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 435 (1994) (“Efficient market theory suggests that 
if the market is functioning correctly, a program focused exclusively on ETIs may produce below-
market rates of return. Put simply, states must place a priority on either maximizing profits, or 
maximizing job creation and community development.”); Geczy, Jeffers, Musto & Tucker, supra note 
70, at 87–88; Smith, supra note 95, at 31–32 (noting “investment returns on public-sector pension 
plans in states with ETI requirements were one percent lower than in states without such 
requirements”). 
 108. See supra Part I.B. 
 109. Granted, “consider” is a low standard and there may not be many activist shareholders with 
sufficient interest and resources to bring such a lawsuit. 
 110. Strine, Jr., supra note 105, at 152–55 (noting that shareholders are the only ones with a vote 
and the only ones with the right to sue derivatively in corporate law, and thus corporate social 
responsibility is likely to have minimal impact on directorial action). 
 111. Cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate 
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 605 (1992) (stating, in the constituency statute context 
that it “is the predictable reaction that this limited enforcement mechanism stimulates in corporate 
directors. If stockholders pose the sole internal threat to directors’ exercise of their otherwise 
untrammelled discretion, then the directors’ best means of protecting themselves from litigation is to 
act in, or at least to ascribe their actions to, the stockholders’ interests.”). 
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diminishes the argument benefit corporation proponents make about the 
social commitment being made by choosing the form.112 While it does not 
appear that ERISA fiduciaries must avoid benefit corporations altogether, 
they may need to proceed with extreme caution given that a primary reason 
benefit corporations are needed is for firms wishing to pursue social ends, 
at the expense of financial returns. 
V. CURRENT AND FUTURE PLACE FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE INVESTING 
A. Venture Capital and Private Equity  
There are certain investment professionals, such as venture 
capitalists and private equity specialists, who manage money exclusively 
or almost exclusively for high-net-worth individuals and sophisticated 
organizations.113 These venture capital and private equity professionals 
have traditionally been given far greater flexibility and have been 
burdened by significantly less regulation than professionals managing 
funds covered by ERISA. Venture capital funds tend to be organized as 
limited partnerships, and limited partnership law—especially in 
Delaware—gives great deference to the contracts entered into by the 
partners.114 Many, if not most, venture capitalists organize their funds 
under Delaware law, which allows waiver or modification of statutory 
fiduciary duties and provides the ability to craft their own terms.115 
Venture capitalists tend to have relatively limited restraints from business 
law or from their contracts with investors, which tend to give venture 
capitalists a great deal of discretion.116 As a general matter of Delaware 
business law, general partners owe duties of loyalty and care to limited 
partners.117 In Delaware, those default duties can be eliminated by 
contract, though the contract will not eliminate the narrow, implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.118 Venture capitalists, however, 
                                                     
 112. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. 235, 247 (2014) (noting the difficulty in securing a two-thirds vote and opining that the 
requirement could be “outcome-determinative” in mergers and acquisitions situations involving 
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 113. PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 7 (1999). 
 114. David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of Contract, 
2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 375–82 (2002). 
 115. Id. at 370–71. 
 116. David Rosenberg, The Two “Cycles” of Venture Capital, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 419, 421, 
428 (2003); see also Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, supra note 114, at 367–68 
(“[T]he managers of venture capital funds have virtually no general legal obligation to behave in the 
best interest of their investors.”). Rosenberg argues that reputational risks act as a safeguard for 
investors in the absence of significant legal protection. Id. at 366. 
 117. Sonet v. Timber Co., L.P., 722 A.2d 319, 322 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
 118. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, 40 A.3d 839, 851–53 (Del. Ch. 2012), judgment 
entered sub nom., (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2012), aff’d, (Del. Nov. 07, 2012); see also Mohsen Manesh, 
786 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:765 
often modify and specify the duties owed through contract.119 Even if not 
bound by law, venture capitalists are often held in check by nonlegal 
means, such as concern for their reputation.120 
Contractarians, like Larry Ribstein, have argued for this flexibility in 
the alternative entity or “uncorporation” context, including the flexibility 
to modify or even eliminate fiduciary duties.121 There has been significant 
debate over whether general partners, as a default, should owe fiduciary 
duties to the limited partners, but most state laws seems to side with default 
duties currently.122 The freedom of contract, given uncorporate firms, such 
as limited partnerships and limited liability companies, has its detractors. 
For example, Sandra Miller has argued for “mandatory minimum 
standards to govern business relationships,” such as those in traditional 
corporations, and Reza Dibadj has argued that contracts alone are 
insufficient to protect investors in uncorporations.123 Likewise, Bill 
                                                     
Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs 
and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 560–67 (2012) (describing Delaware law and the academic debate 
surrounding duties in LPs and LLCs). 
 119. See Rosenberg, Two “Cycles” of Venture Capitalism, supra note 116, at 431–32. 
 120. Id. at 421. 
 121. Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Entities, 54 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 537, 541 (1997). 
 122. Mohsen Manesh, Damning Dictum: The Default Duty Debate in Delaware, 39 J. CORP. L. 
35, 42–43 (2013), citing Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 170 
(Del. 2002). Default fiduciary duties are also present in LLCs, though there was a protracted debate 
on this topic between former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court Myron Steele (arguing 
against default fiduciary duties in the LLC context) and current Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme 
Court Leo Strine (arguing in favor of default fiduciary duties in the LLC context). Chief Justice 
Strine’s view was ultimately accepted. See Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default 
Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 221, 223 (2009); see also Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, 40 A.3d 839, 849–57 (Del. Ch. 
2012) (where then Chancellor Strine wrote that “because the LLC Act provides for principles of equity 
to apply, because LLC managers are clearly fiduciaries, and because fiduciaries owe the fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and care, the LLC Act starts with the default that managers of LLCs owe enforceable 
fiduciary duties”); Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1218–20 (Del. 2012) 
(stating that the Delaware Court of Chancery’s “pronouncements [regarding the existence of default 
fiduciary duties in the LLC context] must be regarded as dictum without any precedential value. . . . 
We remind Delaware judges that the obligation to write judicial opinions on the issues presented is 
not a license to use those opinions as a platform from which to propagate their individual world views 
on issues not presented.”); Ann E. Conaway & Peter I. Tsoflias, Challenging Traditional Thought: No 
Default Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Liability Companies After Auriga, 13 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 
1, 32–33 (2011) (agreeing with Chief Justice Steele and arguing against default fiduciary duties in the 
LLC context); Bruce E. Falby and John L. Reed, Delaware Amends Its LLC Act: Managers and 
Controllers Owe Fiduciary Duties Unless LLC Agreement Provides Otherwise, DLA PIPER PUBL’NS 
(Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2013/08/delaware-amends-
its-llc-act--managers-and-contro/ [https://perma.cc/X2PQ-P6TS]. 
 123. Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into Contract, 41 TULSA L. REV. 
451, 475 (2006); Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the 
Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1609, 1653–54 (2004). 
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Callison, Allan Vestal, and Daniel Kleinberger have argued for limits on 
the contractarian approach.124 
Venture capitalists and their investors tend to be financially 
sophisticated.125 While investors in venture capital funds tend to be fairly 
passive, venture capitalists themselves are incredibly active and generally 
involved with the companies in which their venture capital funds invest.126 
Venture capitalists have a plethora of tools at their disposal to constrain 
agency costs, including: “(1) the use of staged investment; (2) the use of 
equity-based compensation; (3) the retention of control and monitoring 
rights; (4) the sale of convertible preferred stock; and (5) the ability to 
syndicate investments.”127 While typical shareholders may have many of 
these rights in theory, venture capitalists have the ability, in practice, to 
use these tools more effectively.128 Given the sophistication of these types 
of investors and the flexibility afforded by their contracts, venture 
capitalists and private equity professionals may be in a much better 
position to invest in social enterprises. As noted in an earlier section, it 
already seems like most of the funding flowing to benefit corporations and 
other social enterprises is coming from venture capitalists, some of whom 
are focused on social investing in general or have raised money for a 
specific fund focused on social investing.129 
                                                     
 124. J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, Contractarianism and Its Discontents: Reflections 
on Unincorporated Business Organization Law Reform, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 493, 504–06 (2009) 
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supra note 116, at 421 n.9 (2003) (assuming that most venture capital investors understand the 
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Bust: Did Agency Costs Play A Role? Was It Something Lawyers Helped Structure?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 211, 215 (2001) (noting that some venture capitalists, especially those with limited experience, 
may attract less sophisticated investors). 
 126. Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Partnerships Revisited, 67 CIN. L. REV. 953, 958 (1999) (noting 
that investors in venture capital funds are generally passive and that the venture capitalists are given 
wide discretion); Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, supra note 114, at 373–74 (noting 
the “singular influence [of venture capitalists] that is atypical of shareholders in a corporation”). 
 127. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the 
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 52 (2006). 
 128. See generally Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, supra note 114. 
 129. See supra Part II.C. 
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B. Further Department of Labor Clarification Needed? 
At this stage, additional clarification is probably not needed to 
address social enterprise investing (specifically, benefit corporation 
investing) for ERISA fiduciaries. For starters, benefit corporations are just 
now starting to enter the public markets and are doing so in extremely 
small numbers, which might make specific guidance more confusing than 
useful. Also, benefit corporations are quite diverse and neither granting a 
blanket safe harbor nor a blanket prohibition would be the best path. The 
guidance in all three DOL bulletins discussed is clear that financial returns 
should not be sacrificed, though the bulletins differ in the amount of 
caution or encouragement they provide in regard to ETIs.130 As such, 
ERISA fiduciaries are still directed to focus on the financial returns 
available from the investments, and are clearly permitted to consider ESG 
factors as those factors relate to potential financial returns.131 The guidance 
under IB 15-01, which purports to encourage ETIs (or at least not 
discourage them), should not be broadened, as doing so might 
unintentionally increase the likelihood of underinformed or personally 
interested investment decisions.132 Under IB 15-01, ERISA fiduciaries 
may be able to properly consider benefit corporations, but should be aware 
that some benefit corporations may be pursuing projects with below-
market returns.133 Given this fact, additional documentation supporting the 
reasoning of the ERISA fiduciary, while not expressly required by IB 15-
01, may be wise. 
C. Finding a Place for Social Enterprise Investing 
Where does the current guidance leave benefit corporations and those 
wishing to do impact investing more generally? The uncertainty, even if 
slight, may lead ERISA fiduciaries to avoid benefit corporations even if 
they warm up to ETIs in general because benefit corporations have express 
permission to sacrifice shareholder interests, in the short and long term, 
for general public benefit. To be sure, the benefit corporation statutes 
based on the Model require “consideration” of shareholder interests, but 
the statutes do not require that anything be done to address that interest.134 
The Delaware version of the benefit corporation statute, under which 
Laureate Education, Inc. is incorporated, requires “balancing” of 
                                                     
 130. See supra Part III. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See generally Zelinsky, supra note 71. 
 133. Cf. id. 
 134. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a) (2016) (stating that directors “shall consider the 
effects of any action or inaction upon [a long list of corporate stakeholders]”) (emphasis added). 
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shareholder interests, which seems more significant and may give ERISA 
fiduciaries a bit more comfort.135 
One possible solution to the uncertainty is shifting the decision to the 
plan participants. Give the plan participants the ability to opt into benefit 
corporation investments in their plans. These participants, however, are 
generally rationally apathetic and sometimes ignorant, as well. 136 This 
apathy might lead them to ignore the opt-in entirely, but their ignorance 
may lead them to blindly check a box for benefit corporations merely 
because it sounds nice. Anne Tucker has described “citizen shareholders” 
as “the growing group of investors who enter the market through 
employer-sponsored defined contribution plans by investing in mutual 
funds, whose choices are structurally constrained, and who bear the risks 
of the market without the benefit of ownership rights extended to 
traditional shareholders.”137 As recent scholarship has noted, even detailed 
disclosures and explanations about the investment options may not be able 
to solve the ignorance.138 
These impact investments, for now, may be better regulated to more 
sophisticated investors who can determine and contractually customize the 
appropriate balance of purpose and profit for their tastes. In the securities 
law arena, accredited investors are given less protection because they are 
thought to be able to defend themselves, either due to financial resources 
or financial sophistication.139 
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790 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:765 
We remain in the nascent stages of social enterprise, especially in the 
publicly traded arena. In the future, we will be able to better measure the 
financial returns of social enterprises and better assess the various risks. 
At this early stage, it is likely best to regulate the risks to those who can 
bear them best and keep the lion’s share of social enterprise investing to 
those with sophisticated clients. However, social enterprise is also 
showing up in the crowdfunding arena, where investment professionals 
may not be consulted at all. Nevertheless, crowdfunding rules have placed 
some limits on the amounts that can be invested (and thus lost) by 
individuals investing in crowdfunding raises.140 
While it is possible that social enterprises, including benefit 
corporations, will produce market or above-market returns, there is a 
significant amount unknown about these companies as investment 
vehicles. In addition, the limited empirical research done on social 
enterprises shows that they are mostly very young companies; most social 
enterprises also appear to be small, though even less research has been 
done on the relative size of social enterprises.141 As social enterprises 
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mature and we gather better and more extensive data on these entities, it 
may be appropriate to revisit investing in benefit corporations and the 
accompanying warnings may not need to be as strong. 
CONCLUSION 
Companies organized under recently passed social enterprise statutes 
are starting to enter the public markets and become an option for 
investment professionals. Investment professionals covered by ERISA 
should approach social enterprises, such as benefit corporations, with 
caution because a main reason behind the passage of the social enterprise 
statutes was to allow firms to openly and purposefully sacrifice the firms’ 
financial interests for the broader social good. While the Department of 
Labor’s most recent guidance appears to encourage investments with 
collateral, social benefits, ERISA remains clear that the financial interests 
of plan participants and beneficiaries cannot be sacrificed. ERISA-covered 
investment professionals, however, need not completely abandon social 
enterprises, as there may be some firms that use their legal status and the 
benefiting of other stakeholders to financial advantage. As such, ERISA-
covered investment professionals should carefully monitor the social 
enterprise space and thoughtfully analyze individual investments. 
Currently, venture capitalists and other investment professionals who are 
unburdened by ERISA, and who generally deal with more financially 
sophisticated clients, can use contracts to make investments that properly 
address the profit and purpose balance desired by their clients.142 If current 
trends continue, evaluating social enterprises will play an increasing role 
in the lives of investment professionals, requiring close evaluation of the 
growing empirical data, in pursuit of the best interests of their clients. 
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